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The present study compared the accuracy of cue-outcome knowledge gained during
prediction-based and control-based learning in stable and unstable dynamic environments.
Participants either learnt to make cue-interventions in order to control an outcome, or
learnt to predict the outcome from observing changes to the cue values. Study 1 (N = 60)
revealed that in tests of control, after a short period of familiarization, performance of Pre-
dictors was equivalent to Controllers. Study 2 (N = 28) showed that Controllers showed
equivalent task knowledge when to compared to Predictors. Though both Controllers and
Predictors showed good performance at test, overall Controllers showed an advantage.
The cue-outcome knowledge acquired during learning was sufﬁciently ﬂexible to enable
successful transfer to tests of control and prediction.
Keywords: dynamic, decision making, learning, prediction, control
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario inwhich after a visit to your doctor, you are told
that your blood pressure is too high. Following the doctor’s recom-
mendation, you have decided to take up more exercise by jogging,
and to change your diet by reducing your salt intake. In addi-
tion you have bought the latest mobile phone application which
is a self monitoring device that can help you track and analyze
your blood pressure. By steadily increasing exercise and reducing
intake of salty foods (interventions), and measuring your blood
pressure at regular intervals, the idea is to track the relationship
between exercise and salt intake (cues) and blood pressure (out-
come) to assess how effective the new healthy regime is. You notice
that your blood pressure recordings ﬂuctuate while you are resting
(internal, or endogenous, changes in the outcome), as well as when
you have gone for a jog, or eaten (external, or exogenous, changes
in the outcome1). On some days your blood pressure does not
reduce as substantially as on other days, and so on those occasions
you decide to take more exercise.
The above example can be described as dynamic decision mak-
ing, in which decisions (i.e., choosing a course of action) are
adapted to the ongoing changes in the outcome. More speciﬁcally
this type of dynamic decision making involves learning about the
cue-outcome relations via cue-intervention (control-based deci-
sion making). A different approach may involve ﬁrst monitoring
for a period of time the cue-outcome relations by tracking changes
in cues (i.e., observing your usual salt intake from day to day)
from which one can make predictions about changes to the out-
come. This is an example of prediction-based decision making
in which cue-outcome relations are acquired via estimates of the
expected outcome value. The difference between the two is that in
1“An endogenous variable [that] at time t has an effect of its own state at time t + 1
independent of exogenous inﬂuences that might add to the effect” (Funke, 1993,
p. 322).
the latter case there is no cue-intervention; instead, changes in cue
and outcome values are used to adjust the predictions made.
Both prediction and control are methods of acquiring
cue-outcome knowledge, and are examples of dynamic deci-
sion making. General models of learning (e.g., Reinforcement
learning/reward-based learning, Schultz et al., 1997; Sutton and
Barto, 1998; Schultz, 2006) would propose that both predic-
tion and control are comparable ways of acquiring cue-outcome
knowledge, because both rely on prediction errors signals arising
from a comparison between predicted and actually obtained out-
comes. One avenue that this present study explores is to directly
compare the accuracy of cue-outcome knowledge when gained via
prediction and when gained via control, in order to explore these
general claims.
Dynamic decision making (hereafter DDM) is an area of deci-
sion making research that is growing in popularity (Brown and
Steyvers, 2005; Osman et al., 2008; Lurie and Swaminathan, 2009;
Osman, 2010a,b, 2011; Speekenbrink and Shanks, 2010). Typically,
tasks designed to examine this type of process involve situations
in which the decision maker has a clearly deﬁned goal from the
outset. Because the environment is probabilistic and/or dynamic,
the desired goal cannot usually be achieved in one step. There-
fore the decision maker must plan a series of actions that will
help to incrementally move them closer to the goal. Thus, the
process of decision making in dynamic environments is often
described as goal directed, and the decisions themselves are usu-
ally inter-dependent across trials (Brehmer, 1992; Funke, 1992;
Osman, 2010a).
Given this type of characterization, planning actions in order
to obtain future outcomes is an important component of DDM,
and therefore it is likely that some control-based decision are
informedbypredictions (Osman,2010a,b).Moreover, the decision
maker needs to be sensitive to possible changes in the environment
in order to adapt their planned interventions accordingly. For
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this reason DDM is also referred to as adaptive decision making
(Cohen et al., 1996; Klein, 1997; Lipshitz et al., 2001). Typically
in DDM contexts accurate estimates of the environment’s future
behavior are important for planning the best interventions that
would achieve the right outcome.Consider the following engineer-
ing example, in which the goal is to maintain a supply of electricity
from a power station that meets the consumers’ needs. Since there
are obvious changes in the demandaccording todaily aswell as sea-
sonal changes, this enables fairly stable predictions as to consumer
use that enables matching the generator’s output to load predic-
tions.However, it is important to estimate future demands in order
to adjust the system quickly enough as the changes arise (e.g., sud-
den unseasonably low temperatures). Predictions regarding fuel
consumption are essential to informing the choice of intervention
needed to control power supply, and research in the engineering
domain supports this (e.g., Leigh, 1992). In fact, optimal control
theory (Bryson and Ho, 1975) provides a formal basis for analyz-
ing the changing states of a system in order to provide a complete
stochastic description of control under uncertainty. Moreover, the
theory has been implemented in psychological research on human
motor control (e.g., Körding and Wolpert, 2006).
Many theoretical accounts of DDM (Vancouver and Putka,
2000; Burns and Vollmeyer, 2002; Bandura and Locke, 2003;
Goode andBeckmann,2010;Osman,2010a,b) and formal descrip-
tions of DDM (Gibson et al., 1997; Sun et al., 2001; Gibson, 2007)
claim that controlling outcomes to a target goal involves decisions
based onprediction. In their Social-Cognitive theory,Bandura and
Locke (2003) refer to prediction as a feedforward process which
has a motivational component attached to it. They propose that by
estimating future outcomes and future success, when reinforced,
successful predictions drive the decision maker to achieve even
more accurate or more successful control of the environment.
Burns and Vollmeyer (2002) describe DDM within the context of
hypothesis testing. They posit that decision makers learn best by
exploring the DDM environment. This entails generating expecta-
tions about the associations between their actions and the effects
they will produce. The effects they achieve through their actions
are used as feedback to update hypotheses about the relationship
between cues and outcomes in the environment. Gibson’s (Gibson
et al., 1997; Gibson, 2007) neural network model also posits that
DDM involves the development of hypotheses about cue-outcome
associations, from which planned interventions are made. The
model includes two submodels: a forward model and an action
model. The action submodel decides what action to take based on
the current state of the environment and the distance from the
target goal. Each action generates an expected outcome which is
then compared against the goal; from this the action which is most
likely to minimize the distance between the expected state and the
goal is chosen. The forward submodel takes as input an action that
has been executed and compares its outcome with the goal. It then
generates as output an expected outcome which is used to derive
an error signal. Back propagation is thenused to adjust the connec-
tion weights between action and predicted outcome, to improve
the ability to predict the effects of actions on the environment.
Osman’s (2010a,b, 2011) Monitoring and Control framework
also proposes that there are two different judgments made regard-
ing a DDM environment: its predictability and its controllability.
People are sensitive to the endogenous as well as the exogenous
changes in the environment. This is because they are repeatedly
updating their expectancies of the outcomes that will occur in
the environment, and this informs their subjective estimates of
conﬁdence in predicting outcomes of events in a dynamic envi-
ronment (predictability of the environment).Aswell as developing
expectancies about the outcomes that are likely to occur, the
actions taken in the environment generate outcomes which can
be fed back in order to update one’s expectancies. This informs
their subjective estimates of expectancy that an action executed
will achieve a speciﬁc outcome in a control system (predictability
of control).
In sum, the consensus amongst many theorists in the DDM
research domain is that prediction forms a strong component of
the decision making process needed to plan interventions in order
to reliably achieve a target goal (Vollmeyer et al., 1996; Burns and
Vollmeyer, 2002;Gibson, 2007;Osman,2010b).However, there are
alternative accounts of DDM that do not assign a role to predic-
tion. For instance, Berry and Broadbent (1984, 1987, 1988) claim
that people typically fail to provide a veridical verbal description of
their acquired knowledge or to accurately predict different states
of the DDM task because the cue-outcome associations are far
too complex to learn explicitly. Accurate control of the outcome
is achieved through active intervention, from which successful
cue-interventions that generate desired outcomes are stored in
memory and later recalled when faced with similar task situations.
Because there is no need for predictive learning, there is no cue-
abstraction, instead successful control performance is based solely
on representations of action-outcome associations.
There is little empirical research that has investigated the contri-
bution of prediction (i.e., estimating the outcome that will occur)
to control (i.e., planning actions to achieve an outcome) in a
dynamic environment. Thus, it is not clear whether controlling
a dynamic environment relies on prediction, or for that matter,
whether it is possible to learn about a dynamic environment from
prediction alone. This is a limitation given the kinds of different
theoretical claims made about the relevance of prediction to con-
trol. Therefore, the present study aims to separate prediction-based
from control-based learning, and directly compare the accuracy of
cue-outcome knowledge gained from both forms of learning.
There are two relevant literatures that have considered these
issues in isolation, namely, multiple cue probability learning
(MCPL) and complexdynamic control (CDC).ResearchonMCPL
examines how we integrate information from different sources
in order to learn to predict outcomes in probabilistic environ-
ments (Speekenbrink and Shanks, 2010). Typically, MCPL tasks
involve presenting people with cues (e.g., symptoms – rash, fever,
headaches) which are probabilistically associated with an outcome
(e.g., disease – ﬂu, cold). Participants are asked to predict the out-
come (e.g., ﬂu) for various cue combinations (e.g., rash, fever),
and then receive outcome feedback on their prediction. Research
on CDC has investigated the way in which decisions are formed
over time in order to reliably control outcomes in dynamic and
probabilistic environments (Osman, 2008a). People decide from
a set of inputs (cues; e.g., drug A, drug B, drug C) actions that
are relevant (e.g., selecting drug A at dosage X) for achieving and
maintaining a particular output (outcome; e.g., reduce the spread
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of disease Y). As with MCPL environments, input–output (here-
after: cue-outcome) associations are probabilistic, and also need to
be learned. In addition, the environment can also be dynamic, in
the sense that the outcome may change independently of actions
made by the individual (e.g., disease Y spreads at a particular
rate). In MCPL tasks, learning about the cue-outcome associa-
tions is indirect because only observations of the cue patterns are
used to predict the events with the aim of reducing the discrep-
ancy between expected and actual outcomes. By contrast, learning
about the cue-outcome associations is direct in CDC tasks because
the cues are manipulated and the change in outcome that fol-
lows serves as feedback which is used to update knowledge of
cue-outcome associations.
We brieﬂy review the MCPL and CDC literature in the next
section. These research domains have remained relatively sepa-
rate (Osman, 2010a). A secondary objective of this study, besides
comparing prediction-based decision making with control-based
decision making in a DDM environment, is to consider the poten-
tial common ground shared by the MCPL and CDC research
paradigms.
Early MCPL studies were largely concerned with varying differ-
ent properties of the task environment and examining the effects
on predictive accuracy. Properties of the environment that were
varied include: the number of cue-outcome associations (Slovic
et al., 1971), the combination of continuous cue and binary out-
comes (Vlek and van der Heijden, 1970), the presence of irrelevant
cues (Castellan, 1973), the type of feedback presented (Björk-
man, 1971; Hammond et al., 1973; Muchinsky and Dudycha,
1975; Holzworth and Doherty, 1976), time constraints (Rothstein,
1986), and cue validities (Castellan and Edgell, 1973; Edgell, 1974).
In the main, the evidence suggests that people show sensitivity to
the cue validities and cue probabilities. Moreover, it has been sug-
gested that people update their knowledge of the cue-outcome
associations by developing hypothesis testing strategies.
More recently, the weather prediction task (WPT), developed
by Knowlton et al. (1994), has become a popular paradigm
for studying prediction-based decision making. It was originally
designed to study incremental learning processes in clinical pop-
ulations (e.g., amnesic patients). Knowlton et al. (1994) proposed
that amnesics were able to successfully predict outcomes in the
task through incidental acquisition of cue-outcome associations
(procedurally) rather than explicit cue-abstraction (declaratively).
That is to say, accurate cue-outcome knowledge of a probabilistic
environment was acquired through processes that did not require
deliberate evaluation of expected outcomes and actual outcomes.
In support, others (e.g., Knowlton et al., 1996; Poldrack et al.,
2001) have since shown that knowledge acquired procedurally
is not available to conscious inspection, because of the implicit
nature of learning of cue-outcome knowledge. However, critics of
this position have investigated these claims in non-clinical (Price,
2009) as well as clinical populations (Speekenbrink et al., 2008)
and have found evidence to suggest a correspondence between
the accuracy of explicit cue-outcome knowledge and predictive
accuracy, suggesting that people do have insight into the cue-
outcome knowledge they have acquired. This has been taken to
suggest that the strategies people develop to make their predic-
tions are consciously accessible, and that there is an exhaustive
evaluative process involved in comparing expected outcomes with
actual outcomes on a trial by trial basis.
Research on CDC originated with the work of Dörner (1975),
who used control tasks to simulate real world decision making
in complex domains (e.g., maintaining ecologies). This line of
research is now referred to as complex problem solving (Buchner,
1995). Better known however is Broadbent’s early work on con-
trol tasks (Broadbent, 1977; Berry and Broadbent, 1984), which,
like MCPL studies, demonstrated that procedural learning is the
mechanism that supports control-based decision making. As with
the WPT, much of the work that followed from Berry and Broad-
bent’s (1984) pivotal study has examined the type of knowledge
acquired under procedural learning. Broadbent’s Exemplar theory
proposes that while interacting with a CDC task, manipulations
of speciﬁc inputs that lead to successful outcomes are stored as
exemplars in a type of “look-up table.” Controlling a CDC task is
then based on a process of matching environmental cues to similar
stored exemplars, rather than through following the rules acquired
in cue-abstraction. In support, some studies have shown that there
is limited transfer of control performance to versions that differ
from the initial training task, and that people lack insight into the
knowledge gained during learning (Dienes and Fahey, 1995, 1998;
Gonzales et al., 2003).
In contrast, studies that have encouraged hypothesis testing
behavior – either through explicit instruction, or task manipula-
tions such as presenting a task history of action-outcome associa-
tions during learning – have shown that rule learning can lead to
successful control performance. Moreover, under these conditions
cue-outcome knowledge is transferable beyond the trained task
environment to other variants as well as other goal criteria, and
people show accurate reportable knowledge of cue-outcome asso-
ciations (Sanderson, 1989; Burns and Vollmeyer, 2002; Osman,
2008a,b,c). In particular, two recent studies (Osman, 2008a,b)
examined if actively engaging with a CDC task during learn-
ing is necessary for accurate control. Berry (1991) claimed that
successful control is dependent on procedural learning, which
does not generate cue-outcome knowledge. By extension, learning
purely through observation would prevent the uptake of decision-
action-outcome associations, and reduce control performance.
Osman (2008a,b) used a yoking design to compare the effects
of learning through action vs. learning through observation (i.e.,
simply observing cue changes and tracking their effects on the
outcomes). The ﬁndings challenged Berry’s original claims by
demonstrating that learning through observation and learning
through action generate equivalent declarative as well as proce-
dural knowledge. Moreover, the ﬁndings demonstrated that rather
than independent, accuracy of cue-outcome knowledge was posi-
tively associated with control performance. There is an emerging
consensus from recent work with CDC tasks that people apply
hypothesis testing strategies when planning actions which enables
cue-abstraction (e.g., Sun et al., 2001; Burns and Vollmeyer, 2002;
Osman, 2010a,b). Much like the MCPL studies, these ﬁnding sug-
gest that learning to control outcomes involves a deliberate process
of evaluating actions against expected outcomes. Though crucially
in CDC tasks there is an additional step which involves selecting
actions that are expected to reduce the discrepancy between an
achieved and target outcome.
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Asdiscussed earlier,MCPLandCDC tasks sharemany common
properties. In particular they are environments in which the deci-
sion maker is required to learn probabilistic relationships between
cues and outcomes. Moreover, both predicting and controlling an
outcome rely on inferring changes inoutcomevalues frompatterns
of cue/input values. Besides the obvious difference that controlling
an outcome involves direct manipulation of the inputs whereas
predicting outcomes does not, the other key difference is the way
in which the outcome is evaluated (Osman, 2010a).When control-
ling outcomes, the achieved outcome is evaluated with respect to
the target goal.When predicting outcomes, the predicted outcome
is evaluated with respect to the achieved outcome. While there are
no direct comparisons of prediction- and control-based decision
making in dynamic environments, Enkvist et al. (2006) compared
the accuracy of cue-outcome knowledge of a group instructed
to predict the outcome in a MCPL task with a group instructed
to control the outcome to a speciﬁc criterion. They found that
control-based decision making led to more accurate cue-outcome
knowledge. However, this ﬁnding was reversed when binary rather
than continuous cues were used. Also, as already mentioned, Berry
(1991) and Osman (2008a,b,c) yoked active controllers with pas-
sive observers and comparedboth groups on their ability to control
an outcome to criterion over successive trials. While Berry found
an advantage for active controllers, Osman found no difference
between passive and active learners. Osman noted that this diver-
gence can be explained by a critical difference between the stud-
ies: in Osman’s study, all participants were encouraged to learn
through hypothesis testing, while in Berry’s study participants
were explicitly instructed not to engage in hypothesis testing.
Wemay conclude from these ﬁndings that, under certain condi-
tions (i.e., in MCPL tasks when cue-outcome associations involve
continuous variables, and in CDC tasks where instructions pre-
vent hypothesis testing), cue-outcome knowledge is more accurate
when learning is control-based as compared to prediction-based.
However, this conclusion is only tentative, given that to date there
have been no studies that compared both forms of learning within
the same dynamic decision making task.
In the present study, we sought to induce prediction-based
DDM by asking people to ﬁrst learn to predict the effects of
observed actions on the state of the environment. Later on, they
were then asked to control the environment. We compared this
condition to one in which people were instructed to achieve and
maintain a speciﬁc target outcome from the outset. The present
study used a yoking design such that Controllers and Predictors
experienced exactly the same cue-outcome information. To our
knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst to allow such a direct comparison
of prediction and control-based learning in a DDM environment.
Based on reinforcement learning models, if accurate cue-outcome
knowledge is dependent on the generationof prediction errors that
are generated either through prediction or control, then perfor-
mance at test should be equivalent regardless of training condition
(Controllers, Predictors). If however, there are fundamental differ-
ences between prediction-based and control-based learning, then
from previous results in the DDM and MCPL domain, we would
expect that at Predictors should show an overall advantage in test
of prediction, whereas Controllers should show an advantage on
tests of control.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we compared control performance between a
group who learnt to control an outcome from the outset (Con-
trollers) and a yoked group who ﬁrst learnt to predict the outcome
from the cue manipulations of those in the ﬁrst group (Predic-
tors). In addition, we manipulated the level of perturbation (i.e.,
noise) in the environment. A recent study (Osman and Speeken-
brink, 2011) investigatedDDM in tasks inwhich the stability of the
environment was varied such that the autonomous changes to the
outcome were relatively small (low noise) or large (high noise).
The ﬁndings revealed that people were sensitive to the different
rates at which the outcome ﬂuctuated; accuracy of control perfor-
mance suffered in high noise environments and more sub-optimal
strategies were developed. By manipulating the level of noise in
Experiment 1, we examined whether this effect on performance
generalizes to prediction as well as control.
METHODS
Participants
The 60 graduate and undergraduate students who took part in
the study were recruited from the University College London
subject pool and were paid £6 for their participation. The assign-
ment of participants to the four conditions was semi-randomized.
There were a total of four groups (Control High Noise, Con-
trol Low Noise, Prediction High Noise, Prediction Low Noise2),
with 15 participants in each. Pairs of participants (controller and
yoked predictor) were randomly allocated to one of the two noise
conditions3.
DESIGN AND MATERIALS
Experiment 1 included two between subject manipulations,
namely learning mode (prediction-based vs. control-based) and
stability (high noise vs. low noise). Control performance was mea-
sured in two control tests. The task environment consisted of three
cues and one outcome. One of the cues increased and one of the
cues decreased the outcome. The third cue had no effect on the
outcome. More formally, the task environment can be described
as in the following equation
y (t ) = y (t − 1) + 0.65x1 (t ) − 0.65x2 (t ) + e (t )
in which y(t ) is the outcome on trial t, x1 is the positive cue, x2
is the negative cue, and e a random noise component, normally
distributed with a zero mean and SD of 4 (Low Noise) or 16 (High
Noise). The null cue x3 is not included in the equation as it had
no effect on the outcome.
PROCEDURE
Controllers were informed that as part of a medical research team
they would be conducting tests in which they could inject a patient
2The assignment of noise to the system was ﬁrst piloted in order to generate High
variance (16 SD) and low variance (4 SD).
3In order to implement the yoking design in which a participant from each Predic-
tion condition was yoked to a participant from the corresponding control condition,
a control participant performed the experiment ﬁrst in order to generate the learning
trials presented to the yoked predictor.
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with any combination of three hormones (labeled as hormones A,
B, and C), with the aim of maintaining a speciﬁc safe level of
neurotransmitter release. Predictors were assigned the same role,
but were told that they would have to predict the level of neuro-
transmitter release by observing the level of hormones injected.
Figure 1 presents a screen-shot of a learning trial as experienced
by Predictors and Controllers in the experiment. The task was
performed on a desktop computer, using custom software written
in C# for the .NET framework. The task consisted of a total of
80 trials, divided into two phases. The learning phase involved 40
learning trials and the test phase included two tests of 20 trials
each.
Learning phase
On each trial, Controllers adjusted a slider to decide how much
of each hormone to release (a value between 0 and 100). After
conﬁrming their decision, the effect was revealed visually on the
outcome graph. On the next trial, the input values were reset to
0, but the outcome value was retained from the previous trial.
Predictors were shown the input values chosen on that trial by
FIGURE 1 | Screen-shot of a learning trial for predictors and controller.
the Controller they were yoked to. They were asked to predict the
resulting outcome value by moving a slider. Once they were satis-
ﬁed with their prediction, the actual outcome value was revealed
alongside their prediction. On a subsequent trial, the previously
predicted outcome value was omitted from the outcome graph,
but the history of the actual outcome values on the previous ﬁve
trials remained.
Test phase
The test phase was identical for Controllers and Predictors. Con-
trol Test 1 involved the same task as performed by Controllers in
the learning phase; this was the ﬁrst opportunity for Predictors
to control the environment. Control Test 2 involved a different
desired outcome level in order to examine success in controlling
the system to a different criterion4.
SCORING
Prediction performance was measured by a prediction error score
Sp(t ) calculated as the absolute difference between predicted and
expected outcome values:
Sp (t ) =
∣
∣P (t ) − y (t − 1) − 0.65x1 (t ) + 0.65x2 (t )
∣
∣ ,
in which P(t ) is a participant’s prediction on trial t. We chose
to compare predictions to expected rather than actual outcomes
as the latter are subject to random noise, resulting in a biased
comparison between the High and Low Noise conditions.
Control performance was measured by a control error score
Sc(t ) calculated as the absolute difference between the expected
and best possible outcome:
Sc (t ) =
∣
∣G (t ) − y (t − 1) − 0.65x1 (t ) + 0.65x2 (t )
∣
∣ ,
in which G(t ) is the goal on trial t: either the target outcome if
achievable on that trial, or the closest achievable outcome.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Learning phase: controllers
The learning phase was divided into four blocks of 10 trials each.
For the following analyses, prediction and control error scores
were averaged across each block for each participant; these are
presented in Figure 2. A 4× 2 ANOVA was conducted on the con-
trol scores, with Block (learning block 1, 2, 3, 4) as within-subject
factor and Noise (high, low) as a between subject factor. As indi-
cated in Figure 2, therewas amain effect of Block,F(3,84)= 28.89,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.508. To explore the possibility that accu-
racy of control-based decisions improved over blocks of trials,
t -tests revealed that error scores were lower in Blocks 2, 3, and
4 as compare to Block 1 (t = 3.72, p = 0.036, t = 3.76, p = 0.013,
t = 3.04, p = 0.013), no other differences reached signiﬁcance. A
main effect of Noise, F(1,28)= 9.48, p = 0.004, partial η2 = 0.253,
suggests that control performance was poorer in the High com-
pared to the Low Noise condition. Figure 2 also suggests more
4In the learning phase and in Control Test 1, the starting value was 178 and the tar-
get value throughout was 62. Participants were instructed to maintain the outcome
within a safe range (±10) of the target value. In Control Test 2, the starting value
was 156, the target value was 74, and the safe range ±5 from the target value.
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FIGURE 2 | Error scores (± SE) in the learning phase of Experiment 1.
For Controllers, these are control error scores, and for Predictors, these are
predictive error scores.
pronounced learning in theLowNoise compared to theHighNoise
condition, which was supported by a signiﬁcant Noise×Block
interaction, F(3,84)= 3.93, p = 0.011, partial η2 = 0.123.
Learning phase: predictors
A similar ANOVA on the prediction error scores showed a main
effect of Noise, F(1,28)= 6.72, p = 0.015, partial η2 = 0.193, con-
ﬁrming that Predictors in the Low Noise condition outperformed
those in the High Noise condition. The main effect of Block,
F(3,84)= 2.95, p = 0.037, partial η2 = 0.095. To examine if dif-
ferences in performance across-blocks reﬂected learning, t -test
comparisons were conducted, and revealed that prediction error
scores were lower in Blocks 2, 3, and 4 as compare to Block 1
(t = 2.02, p = 0.036, t = 2.63, p = 0.013, t = 2.63, p = 0.013), no
other differences reached signiﬁcance. To summarize, both Pre-
dictors and Controllers showed clear evidence of learning, and
performance in both groups was negatively affected by increasing
the level of noise in the system.
Test phase
The test phase provided the opportunity to compare the four con-
ditions on an equivalent measure of performance. Each test was
divided into two blocks of 10 trials each. The following analy-
ses are based on participants’ average control error scores in each
block and test, as presented in Figure 3. Control error scores were
ﬁrst analyzed with a 2× 2× 2× 2 ANOVA with Test (Control Test
1, 2) and Block (block 1, 2) as within-subject factors, and Learn-
ing Mode (prediction, control), and Noise (high, low) as between
subject factors. The main effect of Test,F(1,56)= 14.94,p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.211, suggests a general practice effect: even though it
included anunfamiliar goal,participants performedbetter inCon-
trol Test 2 than in Control Test 1. There were also practice effects
within tests, as shown by a main effect of Block, F(1,56)= 56.99,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.504. A signiﬁcant Test× Learning Mode
interaction, F(1,56)= 6.00, p < 0.017, partial η2 = 0.097, indi-
cates that Predictors improved their performance more over tests
than Controllers. Controllers performed better than Predictors
in Control Test 1, t (58)= 2.11, p = 0.038, but there was no dif-
ference in Control Test 2, t (58)= 0.68, p = 0.51. In addition,
FIGURE 3 | Control error scores (± SE) of predictors and controllers in
the test phase of Experiment 1.
there was a signiﬁcant Block×Task× Learning Mode interaction,
F(1,56)= 6.38, p = 0.014, partial η2 = 0.102. Follow-up t -tests
indicated that Controllers outperformed Predictors only in the
ﬁrst block of Control Test 1, t (58)= 3.14, p < 0.003; there was no
signiﬁcant difference elsewhere (all p’s> 0.29).
There were two signiﬁcant effects involving noise. Over-
all, participants in the low noise conditions outperformed
those in the high noise conditions, F(1,56)= 14.52, p < 0.001,
partial η2 = 0.206. In addition, a Block ×Noise interaction,
F(1,56)= 13.31, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.192, indicates that this
difference was particularly strong in the second block. To explore
the difference between Controllers and Predictors in the ﬁrst
block of Control Test 1 in more detail, we compared Controllers’
and Predictors’ performance when they were ﬁrst exposed to
the control task. That is, we compared Controllers’ performance
in the ﬁrst block of the learning phase with Predictors’ per-
formance in the ﬁrst block of Control Test 1. The aim of this
across-blocks comparison was to assess the beneﬁt for predic-
tion training prior to encountering the control task. The analysis
revealed no signiﬁcant difference, F(1,28)= 0.44, p = 0.51, par-
tial η2 = 0.016, suggesting that Predictors did not beneﬁt from
their four blocks of prediction learning. In contrast, the same
analysis comparing Controllers performance in the ﬁrst block of
learning with their performance in the ﬁrst block of Control Test
1, F(1,28)= 17.38, p = 0.0002, partial η2 = 0.375, suggested that
their prior experience was beneﬁcial.
The results from this ﬁrst experiment can be summarized as
follows: given that the accuracy of controlling an environment is
dependent to a greater extent on the way the outcome ﬂuctuates
(either in a less noisy or more noisy manner) rather than the mode
of learning of the environment (either predicting or controlling
the outcome), the results are broadly consistent with the view that
control and prediction involve similar processes. Moreover, the
evidence suggests that Osman and Speekenbrink’s (2011) ﬁndings
generalize to prediction as well as control. In addition, Predic-
tors required a short period of familiarization with controlling
the system in the ﬁrst 10 trials of Control Test 1, but after that
were able to control the environment as well as the Controllers
who had been doing so from the outset. However, in this initial
ﬁrst block of testing, Predictors’ performance was no different to
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Controllers’ performance in the ﬁrst block of learning, suggest-
ing that prediction-based learning about cue-outcome relations,
regardless of environmental stability, was not directly transferable
to control. This raises the question whether control-based learn-
ing generates ﬂexible cue-outcome knowledge that would facilitate
performance on tests of prediction.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 indicated a small and transient difference in per-
formance between Controllers and Predictors. In Experiment 2
we sought to further examine this by replicating our ﬁndings and
also examining whether control-based learning generates ﬂexible
knowledge which can be used to predict as well as control the
outcome.
METHOD
Participants
The 30 graduate and undergraduate students that took part were
recruited from Queen Mary College and were paid £6 for their
participation. The assignment of participants to the conditions
followed the same yoking design as Experiment 1. There were two
conditions (Controllers, Predictors), each with 15 participants.
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 with two exceptions.
First, the SDof the noisewas kept at a single intermediate value of 8
(between the High and Low conditions of Experiment 1). Second,
tests of cue-outcome associations (Insight Tests) were presented
directly after Control Test 1 and again after Control Test 2. In the
InsightTests participantswere asked to predict the value of the out-
come or one of the cues, given the values of the other variables. No
feedback was presented in either Insight Test. Each test included
16 trials which were divided into 8 old and 8 new trials, each set
containing 2 trials to predict each target (the outcome, positive,
negative, and null cue). Old trials were randomly selected from
the learning phase (for Controllers these were trials that they had
generated themselves, for Predictors these were the same yoked
learning trials). The eight new trials were designed prior to the
experiment, so neither group had prior experience of them. The
presentation of the 16 trials in each Insight Test was randomized
for each participant. Performance on the insight tests was mea-
sured similarly to the prediction error scores in Experiment 1 as
the absolute difference between predicted and expected value.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Learning phase
The average control and prediction error scores by block (4
blocks of 10 trials each) in the learning phase are presented in
Figure 4. For the Controllers, a one-wayANOVA on control scores
showed a signiﬁcant effect of Block, F(3,42)= 21.93, p < 0.001,
partialη2 = 0.610. Further t -test comparisonswere conducted and
revealed that control error scores were lower in Blocks 2, 3, and
4 as compare to Block 1 (t = 6.67, p < 0.005, t = 5.90, p < 0.005,
t = 11.76, p < 0.005). A similar analysis on the prediction scores
for Predictors showed no effect of Block, F(3,42)= 0.36, p = 0.78,
partial η2 = 0.025. Again, t -tests were conducted to examine if
performance improved across-block. Analyses revealed that com-
paredwith Block 1,prediction error scores were lower in Block 2, 3,
and 4 (t = 2.95,p = 0.011, t = 3.88,p = 0.002, t = 4.18,p = 0.001),
no other comparisons were signiﬁcant.
Test phase
The following analyses were based on the mean control scores by
Block (block, 1, 2) and Test (Control Test 1 and 2) as presented in
FIGURE 4 | Error scores (± SE) in the learning phase of Experiment 2. For Controllers, these are control error scores, and for Predictors, these are predictive
error scores.
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FIGURE 5 | Control error scores (± SE) of predictors and controllers in the test phase of Experiment 2.
Figure 5. A 2× 2× 2 ANOVA was conducted with Test and Block
as within-subject factors, and LearningMode (prediction, control)
as between subject factor. As in Experiment 1, there was a main
effect of Block, F(1,28)= 26.01, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.482.
There was a trend toward an effect of Test, F(1,28)= 3.66,
p = 0.066, partial η2 = 0.115; while failing to reach signiﬁcance,
this effect is consistent with Experiment 1. No other main effects
were signiﬁcant. As with Experiment 1, we used an across-blocks
comparison to assess the beneﬁt for prediction training prior to
encountering the control task. As in Experiment 1, Predictors did
not show an advantage when they ﬁrst came to control the out-
come compared to Controllers, F(1,28)= 1.57, p = 0.221, partial
η2 = 0.057. However, when comparing Controllers’ performance
between block 1 of the learning phase and block 1 of Control
Test 1, their prior experience did facilitate control accuracy at test,
F(1,28)= 3.73, p = 0.064, partial η2 = 0.152.
Insights tests
Experiment 2 also included tests that enabled comparisons of
groups on their ability to accurately predict the states of the sys-
tem. In all analyses reported below, predictions for the null cue
were not taken into account; as this cue had no effect on the out-
come, its value was effectively unpredictable (it was only included
in the set of questions not to alert participants to this fact). We
computed error scores as the absolute difference between partic-
ipants’ predictions and optimal predictions; these are presented
in Figure 6. A 2× 2× 3× 2 ANOVA was conducted with Insight
Test (ﬁrst, second), Trial Type (old, new) and Target (positive cue,
negative cue, outcome) as within-subject factors, and Learning
Mode (prediction, control) as a between subject factor. This analy-
sis showed only a signiﬁcant effect of Trial Type, F(1,28)= 14.51,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.341, indicating better performance for
old than for new items. Other effects were not signiﬁcant. In par-
ticular, there were no effects involving condition (all p’s> 0.10).
Comparing the error scores for predictions of the outcome to the
prediction error scores of Predictors in the learning phase showed
no difference for either Predictors, t (14)= 1.06, p = 0.31 (depen-
dent samples), or Controllers, t (28)= 0.17,p = 0.87 (independent
samples). Thus, Controllers were able to predict the outcome with
a similar accuracy as Predictors who had learned to do so from the
outset.
In sum, the ﬁndings from Experiment 2 suggest that control-
based learning generates cue-outcome knowledge that is sufﬁ-
ciently ﬂexible to enable transfer from control tasks to tests of
cue-outcome knowledge. Moreover, the ﬁndings indicate that
regardless of mode of learning, cue-outcome knowledge is acces-
sible, to the extent that it can be reported in measures of task
insight.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Many accounts of DDM have referred to the importance of pre-
diction in processes designed to control outcomes in a dynamic
environment (Gibson et al., 1997; Osman, 2010a). In fact cog-
nitive architectures such as ACT-R have been developed to
model dynamic decision making, and variants of the frame-
work also include components that assume a prediction-based
process (Gonzales et al., 2003). In addition, general models of
learning (reinforcement learning models/reward-based learning)
claim that prediction-based and control-based decisions generate
equivalent knowledge in dynamic learning environment (Schultz
et al., 1997; Schultz, 2006). However, to date, there has been little
empirical support for this claim in DDM research.
The aim of this investigation was to examine the accuracy
of cue-outcome knowledge when applied to tests of control and
prediction, by comparing prediction-based learning and control-
based learning in the same dynamic environment. We developed
a task in which Controllers and Predictors experienced identi-
cal cue-outcome information in a dynamic environment. Both
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FIGURE 6 | Insight scores (± SE) for predictors and controllers for the insight tests of Experiment 2.
Predictors and Controllers were sensitive to the stability of the
DDM environment, suggesting that there is greater accuracy in
controlling and predicting outcomes in stable than in unstable
environments. In both experiments we showed that predictive
learning is sufﬁcient to enable accurate control of an outcome in
dynamic environments that varied according to stability. After an
initial period of familiarization (approximately 10 trials) with the
control test, Predictors’ control accuracy was equivalent to that
of Controllers. However, in both experiments Predictors’ expe-
rience during learning did not generate cue-outcome knowledge
that initially facilitated control performance. In contrast,we found
that control-based experience during learning enabled successful
transfer to predictive tests of cue-outcome associations as well as
to tests of control. The discussion focuses on two questions: Did
Predictors and Controllers learn in the same way? and How do
prediction and control in the present study relate to conceptual-
izations of prediction and control in other decision making and
learning domains?
DID PREDICTORS AND CONTROLLERS LEARN IN THE SAME WAY?
We propose that fundamentally prediction and control share basic
properties when it comes to evaluating the outcome. In line
with Gibson et al.’s (1997) action model, control-based learning
involves an online comparison between the expected outcome and
achieved outcome, as well as an online comparison between the
achieved outcome and the target outcome. Both comparisons are
used to form a judgment as to which action to take in order to
reach and maintain the target outcome in dynamic tasks with
a non-independent trial structure (Gibson et al., 1997; Gibson,
2007). We also propose that, in line with Gibson’s action model,
prediction-based learning involves an online comparison between
an expected outcome and an achieved outcome, whereas control-
based decisions are based on a comparison between the achieved
and target outcome. Thus, prediction-based and control-based
DDM are similar because both evaluate the achieved outcome
according to their expected outcome. Given that in general pre-
dictive accuracy was equivalent for Predictors and Controllers,
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the comparison between actual outcome and expected outcome
appears to be sufﬁcient to enable the acquisition of accurate cue-
outcome knowledge. However, in both experiments the ﬁndings
suggest that this comparison is not sufﬁcient to facilitate initial
transfer to tests of control, instead training that involves deci-
sions based on comparisons between expected outcome and target
outcome is needed. These comparisons are required for plan-
ning and our results suggest that such comparisons may need
some time to develop, even when cue-outcome knowledge itself is
already accurate. Learning cue-outcome relations involves updat-
ing expected outcomes in light of achieved outcomes. Learning to
control involves updating the expected distance from the goal to
the actually achieved distance from the goal.
We have suggested that the critical factor differentiating Pre-
dictors from Controllers is related to the type of comparison
made (comparing expected to achieved outcomes, and compar-
ing achieved outcomes to the goal outcome). However, there were
other factors that may have contributed to the difference between
Predictors and Controllers in initial tests of control. In the present
study both types of learners could be differentiated in the follow-
ing three ways. For instance, Controllers intervened on the cues
directly, while Predictors could not. Some in the CDC research
domain treat this as an important difference given that CDC tasks
lend themselves to procedural rather than declarative forms of
learning (Berry, 1991; Lee, 1995). In addition,Controllers received
different feedback to Predictors. Controllers received feedback
with respect to the deviation of their achieved outcome from
the target outcome on a trial by trial basis. While this informa-
tion was also presented to Predictors during learning, it was not
directly relevant for their decisions.Only Predictors received direct
feedback about the difference between their predicted (expected)
outcome and the outcome actually achieved. However, we would
argue that Controllers also formed expectations of the outcome
value based on their cue-interventions and re-evaluated these
predictions in light of to the actual achieved outcome. Finally,
Controllers’ actions had direct effects on the outcome in the actual
DDM environment, whereas for Predictors an action (prediction)
had no consequence on the outcome in the DDM environment.
It may be the case that the advantage for Controllers stems from
a more thorough evaluation of their decisions because errors not
only affect the current outcome, but also future actions and out-
comes. For instance, by making a poor cue-intervention which
increases the deviation between achieved outcome and target out-
come, future actions will have to compensate, and several more
actions may be needed to reach the goal. Although Predictors may
feel intrinsically motivated to make accurate predictions, and so
an error would generate some personal dissonance, predictions
do not require the type of planning behaviors needed in control.
Further investigation is needed to examine these potential factors,
for instance by varying feedback (e.g., positive, negative feedback)
and reward (e.g., incentivizing accurate decisions).
HOW DOES PREDICTION AND CONTROL IN THE PRESENT STUDY
RELATE TO CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF PREDICTION AND CONTROL IN
OTHER DECISION MAKING AND LEARNING DOMAINS?
MCPL vs. CDC tasks
With respect to the CDC research community the paradigm we
used to examine prediction and control relates directly to other
dynamic decisionmaking tasks (Berry andBroadbent, 1987; Burns
and Vollmeyer, 2002; Gonzales et al., 2003; Osman, 2008a). Cru-
cially, the ﬁndings are consistent with the claim that Controllers
base their decisions on predictions (Burns and Vollmeyer, 2002;
Gibson et al., 1997; Goode and Beckmann, 2010; Osman, 2010a,b;
Sun et al., 2001). In the present study the task environment
in which prediction was examined involved cumulative changes
across trials, whereas in typical MCPL tasks there is no depen-
dency between trials. If prediction and control are determined by
the type of environment in which they are tested, it may be that
this qualitative difference between MCPL and CDC tasks does
not allow one to draw strong conclusions about the similarities
between prediction and control, or to generalize our ﬁndings to
MCPL research. However, if MCPL tasks were designed with a
dependent trial structure then our ﬁndings suggest that in sta-
ble and unstable dynamic environments, cue-outcome knowledge
via prediction does not prevent accurate control-based decisions,
although it does not facilitate initial transfer of knowledge to
control tasks. Further research is required to examine the extent
to which these ﬁndings generalize to task environments that are
traditionally studied in MCPL tasks. If the trial structure makes
little difference, then based on the ﬁndings from this experiment,
we would still predict that overall cue-outcome knowledge for
Controllers over Predictors should be equivalent.
Observation vs. intervention
Prediction- and control-based learning can also be viewed within
the context of causal reasoning research which contrasts learning
via intervention and observation (Meder et al., 2008; Hagmayer
et al., 2010). Prediction and observation are both indirect ways
of learning about an environment, whereas control and inter-
vention involve direct interaction with the environment while
learning (Lagnado and Sloman, 2004; Osman, 2010b). The dis-
tinction between these forms of interaction with the environment
has been made using formal models (Spirtes et al., 1993; Pearl,
2000) which capture probabilistic dependencies in a given set of
data as well as their relationship to the causal structures that could
have generated the data. These models provide a strong theoretical
basis for arguing that intervention is a crucial component in the
acquisition of causal structures.
Studies that examine causal structure learning often require
participants to either infer the causal structure from observing
causes and effects, or from active learning by manipulating a can-
didate cause and observing the effects that follow. The evidence
suggests that causal knowledge is more accurate when making
interventions on causes than when observing causes and their
effects (Steyvers et al., 2003; Lagnado and Sloman, 2004). Com-
parisons between observation and interventionhave typically been
conducted in static environments (for an exception see Hagmayer
et al., 2010), and observation-based learning involves tracking
causes and their effects as well as predicting changes in effects
given speciﬁc causes. Though not commonly referred to, there is a
close association between causal reasoning and DDM according to
the ways in which prediction (observation) and control (interven-
tion) generate cue-outcome knowledge. Funke and Müller (1988)
found that while control performance was marginally impaired
when learning was observation-based, causal knowledge of the
environment was generally not inﬂuenced by mode of learning,
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and accuracy of casual knowledge predicted control performance.
Moreover, recent work that has explored different types of inter-
vention suggests that it is not always the case that intervention is
superior to observation. There is converging evidence that atomic
interventions (i.e., ones in which acting on the environment will
clearly reveal some aspect of the causal structure) lead to supe-
rior casual knowledge as compared with uncertain interventions
(i.e., ones in which actions may not ﬁx the state of a variable quite
so clearly; e.g., Hagmayer et al., 2010; Meder et al., 2008). While
interventions are generally helpful in uncovering casual structures,
there is evidence to suggest that observation-based learning can
generatemore accurate causal knowledge than uncertain interven-
tions for particular environments (e.g.,Meder et al., 2008).Viewed
from this perspective, the ﬁndings from the present study suggest
that the accuracy of casual knowledge is not impaired when learn-
ing is observation-based rather than intervention-based, assuming
that parallels can be drawn between observation and prediction.
However, again, to forge links between CDC research and causal
learning, research is needed to explore the extent to which the
types of interventions involved in controlling a dynamic environ-
ment are similar to the kinds of interventions used to uncover
causal structures, where the latter are typically studied in static
environments.
Model-free vs. model-based learning
It is worth examining the possible relationship between predic-
tion and control in the present study with a distinction made in
machine learning concerning model-free and model-based rein-
forcement learning systems (e.g., Sutton and Barto, 1998; Dayan
and Daw, 2008; Gläscher et al., 2010). Both model-free and model-
based learning involve predictions about the expected reward from
future actions, but the mechanism by which this is acquired is
different. Model-based learning involves constructing a model
of the task environment, which informs the agent about the
expected consequences of actions taken in particular situations.
Actions can move the environment from one state to another
and the agent’s aim is to move the environment to the state with
the highest reward. Thus, the agent’s learning involves the full
sequence from action to state to reward whereas in model-free
learning the agent learns action-reward pairings directly. Model-
basedmethods aremoreﬂexible and canmore easily accommodate
changes in the state-reward pairings. Adaptation to changes in
the reward structure is much slower with model-free methods. In
our study Predictors were encouraged to learn the cue-outcome
associations before being tested on their ability to decide upon
actions to move the system to a desired state. In this way, Predic-
tors could be described as model-based learners. The Controllers
on the other hand were not explicitly encouraged (though not
discouraged) to learn about the structure of the system. But
given their performance in tests of prediction, we would spec-
ulate that their learning was also model-based. While the initial
differences in control performance imply that Predictors and Con-
trollers may have been using different strategies, further research
is needed to explore the association between learning strategies
(model-free vs. model-based) and modes of learning (prediction
vs. control).
CONCLUSION
While prediction is crucial to control, and both tend to be
described as complementary processes, in this article we consid-
ered the question whether learning to control a dynamic environ-
ment involves decisions based on prediction, andwhether learning
via prediction is sufﬁcient to enable accurate control. The evidence
from two experiments suggests that accurate cue-outcome knowl-
edge is gained via prediction and control, and in general both
forms of learning enable transfer to tests of prediction and control.
However, Predictors required some familiarization with control
whereas Controllers were able to transfer their knowledge to tests
of prediction without familiarization to the tests. We propose that
Predictors and Controllers evaluated the outcome according to the
discrepancy between expected and actual outcomes,whereas Con-
trollers also evaluate the outcome with respect to an intended goal.
While there are processes shared by prediction and control, the
critical difference between them appears enough to generate more
ﬂexible cue-outcome knowledge for Controllers than Predictors.
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